Mario José Petit de Murat, Teología de la historia. Compilación de Pascual Viejobueno. San Miguel de Tucumán, Editorial UNSTA, 2021, 258 pp. ISBN 978-987-8421-03-2.

El artículo “El fundamento de nuestras opciones” indaga acerca de la pregunta “por qué elegimos lo que elegimos”. Se trata del fruto de las lecturas realizadas en el Centro de Estudios In Veritatem acerca de los temas del libre albedrío y el acto de elección. Este último corresponde a la voluntad, pero la inteligencia no permanece ajena, ya que a ella le corresponden otros momentos en el mecanismo del acto humano. El trabajo apela también a considerar el papel que compete (...) a la sensibilidad o a las pasiones y a la influencia que tienen asimismo las circunstancias o el contexto. Concluye con la importancia que el tema de la libertad tiene en la moral y el derecho. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 351-383 [Access article in PDF] Hume's Pyrrhonian Skepticism and the Belief in Causal Laws Graciela De Pierris Hume endorses in no uncertain terms the normative use of causal reasoning. The most striking example of this commitment is Hume's argument in the Enquiry against the possibility of miracles. The argument sanctions, in particular, the use of scientific reflection on uniform experience (...) issuing in causal laws of nature (E 114): "A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined." 1 These words should give us pause; for how can Hume so confidently say, after his skeptical conclusions concerning our causal beliefs, that "a firm and unalterable experience has established" the laws of nature, and that we can therefore produce "proofs" against miracles? The Treatise gives rise to the same puzzle. In this text, too, Hume confidently prescribes methodical reflection based on causal reasoning. For example, in Book One, Part Three, Section Fifteen, Hume offers eight "Rules by which to judge of causes and effects." These rules are more than descriptions of our natural causal inferences. They are meant to guide us in making better causal inferences; in Hume's words they "ought to regulate" our probable reasoning since (T 149): "by them we learn to distinguish the accidental circumstances from the efficacious causes." 2Moreover, Hume consistently takes Newtonian science as a model for the proper employment of causal inferences in inquiries into matters of fact and, [End Page 351] in particular, as a model to be followed in his own science of human nature. 3 This paradigm of what the science of nature ought to be is understood by Hume as an inductive, experimental inquiry. 4 In the Enquiry, for example, Hume uses the label "sciences" for "politics, natural philosophy, physic, chemistry, &c." and in the preceding discussion argues that these sciences are not a priori but are based on causal reasoning (E 164-165). Thus, there are for Hume inquiries into matters of fact and existence that amount to more than blindly following natural propensities and habit. The sciences and many of our causal inferences in common life involve more than mere belief as a sentiment. They involve, in addition, careful reflection that results in improved causal inferences and thus provides normative standards. Yet, in thus upholding the normative use of causal reasoning in science and in everyday life, Hume appears to contradict his own radical skeptical conclusions concerning our knowledge of causation and induction. I here propose a novel way to resolve this puzzle.To acknowledge the existence of a puzzle, however, amounts to accepting the now controversial view that Hume provides, and takes at face value, a radical skeptical argument concerning our knowledge of causation and induction. 5 Moreover, the attempt to resolve this puzzle involves rejecting the suggestion [End Page 352] that Hume, without awareness or concern, happily holds flatly inconsistent views. 6 It also goes against the more sophisticated suggestion that Hume lightly alternates among different psychological moods, or perhaps different perspectives, which might eventually issue in results that contradict each other but are sufficiently localized so as to prevent serious conflict. Such a view might lead us to conceive Hume's texts as an unstructured and arbitrary patchwork of reflections, driven by different psychological moods or by the embellishments of a radiant literary style. This kind of reading is unacceptable as an interpretative tool, however, as H. J. Paton has acutely noted in his criticism of the patchwork interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. 7 For such a reading would place no constraints at all on the task of establishing which parts of Hume's text belong to which moods or perspectives. The suggestion that Hume offers an unstructured patchwork of reflections masks the novel and systematic distinction Hume draws between his radical philosophical... (shrink)

Hume’s discussion of space, time, and mathematics at T 1.2 appeared to many earlier commentators as one of the weakest parts of his philosophy. From the point of view of pure mathematics, for example, Hume’s assumptions about the infinite may appear as crude misunderstandings of the continuum and infinite divisibility. I shall argue, on the contrary, that Hume’s views on this topic are deeply connected with his radically empiricist reliance on phenomenologically given sensory images. He insightfully shows that, working within (...) this epistemological model, we cannot attain complete certainty about the continuum but only at most about discrete quantity. Geometry, in contrast to arithmetic, cannot be a fully exact science. A number of more recent commentators have offered sympathetic interpretations of Hume’s discussion aiming to correct the older tendency to dismiss this part of the Treatise as weak and confused. Most of these commentators interpret Hume as anticipating the contemporary idea of a finite or discrete geometry. They view Hume’s conception that space is composed of simple indivisible minima as a forerunner of the conception that space is a discretely (rather than continuously) ordered set. This approach, in my view, is helpful as far as it goes, but there are several important features of Hume’s discussion that are not sufficiently appreciated. I go beyond these recent commentators by emphasizing three of Hume’s most original contributions. First, Hume’s epistemological model invokes the “confounding” of indivisible minima to explain the appearance of spatial continuity. Second, Hume’s sharp contrast between the perfect exactitude of arithmetic and the irremediable inexactitude of geometry reverses the more familiar conception of the early modern tradition in pure mathematics, according to which geometry (the science of continuous quantity) has its own standard of equality that is independent from and more exact than any corresponding standard supplied by algebra and arithmetic (the sciences of discrete quantity). Third, Hume has a developed explanation of how geometry (traditional Euclidean geometry) is nonetheless possible as an axiomatic demonstrative science possessing considerably more exactitude and certainty that the “loose judgements” of the vulgar. (shrink)

La noción de sistema de equivalencias adquiere en la fenomenología merleaupon-tyana un lugar central, puesto que allí subyace una función general de transposición tácita. Se trata de un principio de comprensión sin explicación analógica, una síntesis sin análisis, tal como puede observarse, por ejemplo, en la plasticidad, la transferi-bilidad y la analogicidad que caracteriza a los hábitos. Sobre esta base, este artículo seguirá un camino regresivo a fin de desvelar que el sentido de las equivalencias y transposiciones está latente en (...) "las matrices simbólicas", que ofrecen una clave para comprender que los fenómenos de expresión, que tienen lugar en el mundo a través del cuerpo, del lenguaje, de la historia y del arte, deben ser vistos como nudos, emblemas de sentido en los que se hace visible una dimensión temporal. Las matrices simbólicas son "centros organizadores" y, por lo tanto, "centros de significación" que se retoman una y otra vez. The notion of a system of equivalences comes to have in Merleau-Ponty's phe-nomenology a central place because lying under there is a general function of tacit transposition. It is a principle for understanding without analogical explanation, i.e., a synthesis without analysis, as can be seen, for example, in the plasticity, transferability, and likeliness that characterizes habits. On this basis, the article will follow a regres-sive way in order to show that the meaning of the equivalences and transpositions is latent in "the symbolic matrixes" that offer a clue to understand that the phenomena of expression, which occur in the world by means of the body, language, history, and art, should be seen as nodes or emblems of meaning in which a temporal dimension shows itself. Symbolic matrixes are "organizing centers", and thus "centers of signi-ficance" that are taken up over and over again. (shrink)

By giving the proper emphasis to both radical skepticism and naturalism as two independent standpoints in Hume, I wish to propose a more satisfactory account of some of the more puzzling Humean claims on causation. I place these claims alternatively in either the philosophical standpoint of the radical skeptic or in the standpoint of everyday and scientific beliefs. I characterize Hume’s radical skeptical standpoint in relation to Hume’s perceptual model of the traditional theory of ideas, and I argue that Hume‘s (...) radical skeptical argument concerning our causal inferences is inextricably linked to his skeptical argument concerning our idea of a necessary connection between cause and effect. I discuss Hume’s naturalistic account of the origin of our idea of necessity and offer a new reading of Hume’s two “definitions” of cause. I argue along the way against central aspects of two opposing styles of interpretation---Norman Kemp Smith’s and Annette Baier’s, on the one hand, and Robert Fogelin’s, on the other---that in my view do not appreciate the mutual autonomy of radical skepticism and naturalism in Hume. (shrink)

En este artículo realizaremos una lectura crítica de la teoría de la dominación propuesta por Bourdieu en el capítulo octavo de El sentido práctico, titulado “Los modos de dominación”. Allí se distinguen con claridad dos modos de dominación: la violencia abierta y la violencia simbólica, aseguradas en su reproducción por el pasaje de las relaciones interpersonales en “la sociedad tradicional” a la institucionalización vía mecanismos objetivos en la sociedad capitalista. En ese sentido, mostraremos continuidades y diferencias relativas a la versión (...) inicial de esta teoría presente en La reproducción, y, luego, propondremos una revisión crítica de esta teoría y de la distinción, tan clásica como problemática, entre objetividad y subjetividad con el propósito de contribuir al desarrollo de una fenomenología social de la dominación con fundamento en la obra de Bourdieu. (shrink)

The objective of the work is to analyze the intersectional discriminations that operate in the multiple identities of regional migrant women in the field of health in Argentina during the present pandemic. We will begin with the critical study of key categories and the origin of the inequalities of law of the aforementioned discrimination in migration policies. Second, we will address de facto inequalities, particularly examining the socio-economic inequalities suffered by migrants during the pandemic. Thirdly, in order to enable alternative (...) forms of care and self-care from the recognition of their ethnicity and the inseparable care of the earth, we propose the application of the concept of territorial participatory justice as a condition of intercultural dialogue in health. As a proposal, it seeks to promote dialogues of knowledge located outside the bureaucratic councils and expanding the social base of health rights from the pluriculturality exercised in care networks of migrant women in the territory and not from their domesticated participation. (shrink)

The modem rationalist tradition initiated by Descartes has as one of its central tenets the independence of the human understanding from the senses. Regardless of the different ways in which independence from experience is understood, there is much common ground among the modem views on the a priori. Yet Kant, culminating this tradition, introduces an entirely new conception of the a priori never before articulated in the history of philosophy. This is the notion of elements in knowledge which are independent (...) of experience but nevertheless closely connected, in a special way, with experience.Although for Kant the a priori has a privileged position in the structure of knowledge - as it has for other modem rationalist philosophers - one of the most striking, and often neglected, aspect of his conception of the a priori is the great extent to which it is opposed to foundationalism. (shrink)

In this paper we attempt to physically interpret the Modal Kochen–Specker theorem. In order to do so, we analyze the features of the possible properties of quantum systems arising from the elements in an orthomodular lattice and distinguish the use of “possibility” in the classical and quantum formalisms. Taking into account the modal and many worlds non-collapse interpretation of the projection postulate, we discuss how the MKS theorem rules the constraints to actualization, and thus, the relation between actual and possible (...) realms. (shrink)

The COVID-19 virus was unveiled to the world as a health crisis and later also as an economic crisis. For some organisations, it has become an ethical crisis. This is certainly the case for large organisations in Australia, where the way many enterprises handled a government wage subsidy called JobKeeper led to a public backlash, media pressure, and a variety of responses ranging from ‘We acted legally’ to the full return of the subsidy. Some organisations later reported profits, and the (...) public response indicated concern about this behaviour, many considering it immoral despite it being legally compliant. It is, we contend, a question to which stakeholder theory can be applied, examining how organisations view and respond to the public. We use content analysis of mainstream media to provide information about public reactions and information from official sources to confirm corporate action. We show that there is a significant ethical component in the public response to the behaviour of organisations as they respond to the crisis. COVID has been an ethical, health, and financial crisis for these organisations. Public pressure, exerted in and through the media, made the general public a definite stakeholder. (shrink)

El derecho a migrar, como el derecho a la salud del migrante, se encuentran reconocidos en la Ley de Migraciones Nro. 25871/2003 de Argentina. Dicha ley constituye un avance legislativo en derechos humanos; resultado de un largo proceso constituyente, deliberativo, que dio lugar a un modelo inclusivo de migración sin precedentes internacionales en su momento. Sin embargo, recientemente asistimos a un giro en políticas migratorias (DNU 70/2017). Como consecuencia, se produce un retroceso en derechos sociales y políticos. En lo que (...) hace al derecho a la salud, la instauración de políticas neoconservadoras (Cobertura Universal de la Salud –CUS-) impulsó leyes provinciales (Ley 6119/2019) destinadas a exigir seguros pagos de salud para migrantes, contrarios a nuestra constitución. El objetivo del presente trabajo es analizar las raíces de éstos cambios en las normativas citadas sobre migraciones y salud; aplicando un marco de justicia social que nos permita comprender, críticamente, cómo la bifurcación de políticas distributivas y de reconocimiento en las mismas legislaciones habilitó el desarrollo de políticas neoconservadoras impuestas a través de decretos autoritarios; cuyas consecuencias trascienden la esfera de los migrantes, haciendo peligrar al mismo sistema de salud argentino como bien público. (shrink)

Graciela De Pierris presents a novel interpretation of the relationship between skepticism and naturalism in Hume's epistemology, and a new appraisal of Hume's place within early modern thought. Contrary to dominant readings, she argues that Hume does offer skeptical arguments concerning causation and induction in Book I, Part III of the Treatise, and presents a detailed reading of the skeptical argument she finds there and how this argument initiates a train of skeptical reasoning that begins in Part III and (...) culminates in Part IV. She goes on to demonstrate that Hume was committed to the Newtonian inductive method while rejecting the place of the supernatural in our understanding of nature. (shrink)

Traditionally the modern theory of ideas has been discussed primarily in reference to its alleged introduction of a veil of mental items between the mind and the world, which leads, through the empiricists, to radical skepticism about the existence of an external world. Here I propose to emphasize an entirely different aspect of the Cartesian theory of ideas which, in my view, is more fundamental in opening the empiricist path that leads to Hume’s radical skepticism. I argue that what I (...) call the “phenomenological presentation” model of ultimate justification is rooted in a fundamental ambiguity between sensible and intellectual apprehension insinuated by Descartes’s view of “clear and distinct” ideas together with his emphasis on the priority of intuition over logical inference. Sensible apprehension relies on immediate acquaintance with items pheno-menologically and ostensively present before the mind as given particulars. The phenomenological presentation model takes its clues from sensible apprehension, although the items present before the mind might themselves be either ideas of the understanding, images of the imagination, sensory impressions, or material external objects. Intellectual apprehension, by contrast, as I illustrate with Leibniz’s model of our knowledge of concepts and truths of reason, consists in the discursive, non-ostensive grasping of the generality of abstract concepts and of formal structures . For Leibniz, all intellectual apprehension is unambiguously “logical discursive apprehension” as opposed to “direct ostensive apprehension.” Thus, Leibniz unmistakably disambiguates Descartes’s model in favor of a precise intellectual model. The empiricists, by contrast, correspondingly disambiguate Descartes’s conception in favor of an entirely sensible model.Tradicionalmente, a teoria moderna das idéias foi discutida principalmente em conexão com a sua suposta introdução de um véu de itens mentais entre a mente e o mundo que leva, por meio dos empiristas, ao ceticismo radical sobre a existência de um mundo externo. Aqui eu proponho enfatizar um aspecto completamente diferente da teoria Cartesiana das idéias que, na minha visão, é mais fundamental no que diz respeito a abrir o caminho empirista que conduz ao ceticismo radical de Hume. Eu argumento que o que eu chamo de o modelo de “apresentação fenomenológica” de justificação última está baseado em uma ambigüidade fundamental entre apreensão sensível e intelectual insinuada pela visão de Descartes de idéias “claras e distintas” junto com a sua ênfase na prioridade da intuição sobre inferência lógica. A apreensão sensível confia no contato imediato com itens presentes fenomenologicamente e ostensivamente perante a mente como particulares dados. O modelo de apresentação fenomenológica está inspirado na apreensão sensível, embora os itens que se apresentam perante a mente poderiam ser eles mesmos idéias do entendimento, figuras da imaginação, impressões sensórias, ou objetos externos materiais. A apreensão intelectual, por contraste, como eu ilustro com o modelo de Leibniz de nosso conhecimento de conceitos e verdades da razão, consiste na compreensão discursiva e não-ostensiva da generalidade de conceitos abstratos e de estruturas formais . Para Leibniz, toda a apreensão intelectual é claramente “apreensão discursiva lógica” por oposição a “apreensão ostensiva direta”. Assim, Leibniz claramente desfaz a ambigüidade do modelo de Descartes em favor de um modelo intelectual preciso. Os empiristas, por contraste, desfazem a ambigüidade da concepção de Descartes em favor de um modelo completamente sensível. (shrink)

In this article we discuss the contextual character of quantum mechanics in the framework of modal interpretations. We investigate its historical origin and relate contemporary modal interpretations to those proposed by M. Born and W. Heisenberg. We present then a general characterization of what we consider to be a modal interpretation. Following previous papers in which we have introduced modalities in the Kochen-Specker theorem, we investigate the consequences of these theorems in relation to the modal interpretations of quantum mechanics.

El artículo tiene como finalidad justificar por qué es importante incluir las pedagogías propias de los pueblos originarios en los programas de formación docente de educación básica a nivel nacional, como valores compartidos de su patrimonio cultural tangible e intangible. Este patrimonio cultural es el pilar histórico de México, que por supuesto no se encuentra sólo en los pueblos originarios, sino que responde a un proceso histórico social determinado de la nación y que, a pesar de la conquista europea, siguió (...) prevaleciendo en las pedagogías y valores propios de los pueblos originarios. Proponemos cristalizar estos patrimonios culturales de los pueblos originarios para ser considerados como pedagogías propias en los programas de formación docente y desde este campo de formación compartir los valores culturales a través de sus saberes, sabidurías y prácticas culturales que han prevalecido a lo largo de la historia y que den cuenta en los planes y programas de estudio con igualdad y equidad cultural en el Sistema Educativo Nacional. Asimismo, se exponen los procesos de contradicción que los pueblos originarios han vivido y han asumido a lo largo de las políticas educativas dirigidas a la educación indígena. Finalmente, se plantean algunas consideraciones para estos programas de formación docente. (shrink)

In the First Chapter, I give an interpretation of Kant's characterization of a priori knowledge which sharply distinguishes Kant's from an innatist conception; in this way, I distinguish Kant's transcendental explanation of a prioricity from both innatist and naturalistic explanations. ;The arguments given by Kant to support his claim that we are in fact in possession of a priori knowledge rely on his criterion of a prioricity: if a truth is necessary then it must be justified a priori. I criticize (...) the criterion's failure to account for actual cases of being justified in believing necessary truths. Finally, I discuss whether Kant has arguments to show that there is a priori knowledge which are independent of the criterion. ;In the Second Chapter, I examine the similarities and differences between Kant's and Frege's conceptions of a priori knowledge. I argue that Frege, like Kant, concentrates exclusively on the ways we must justify our beliefs in certain truths . I show, however, that Frege does not have straightforward arguments to prove that we can and do know a priori any arithmetical or logical truths, and that he does not have any straightforward explanation of the a prioricity of the laws of logic. Finally, I argue that even though a priori items of knowledge play a privileged role in Frege's project, this role differs from the one that such items have in a Kantian-transcendental project. ;In the Third Chapter, I explore whether we can make sense of the notion of a prioricity and prove that there is a priori knowledge by adopting an approach to justification which differs from both Kant's and Frege's. This approach does not concentrate on the ways we must be justified, but on the actual ways we justify our beliefs. I argue that this approach faces enormous difficulties regarding a prioricity. The central difficulty is that the actual complete justification for a belief cannot be captured exclusively in propositional terms. If a belief is based on inference, practical abilities, tendencies or dispositions enter in its justification. . . . UMI. (shrink)

Puesto que la filosofía de Merleau-Ponty hasido presentada explícitamente como una filosofía de la ambigüedad, es necesario examinar el significado y el alcance de esta noción a lo largo de su desarrollo. En primer lugar, se contrapone la ambigüedad a la ambivalencia en razón de que ésta no nos permite alcanzar intelecciones claras, se diferencian sus dos sentidos -existencial y conceptual-, y se señala su asociación con la dialéctica. Luego el artículo continúa con el examen de las ambigüedades que caracterizaa (...) la relación entre cuerpo y espíritu,lenguaje y espíritu, e historia y coexistencia.Por último, se intenta mostrar la perspectiva para el humanismo que surge de una situación en que la contingencia tiene un papel decisivo, de modo que ningún principio explicativo puede eliminar las dificultades o la opacidad en la interacción social. (shrink)

Traditionally the modern theory of ideas has been discussed primarily in reference to its alleged introduction of a veil of mental items between the mind and the world, which leads, through the empiricists, to radical skepticism about the existence of an external world. Here I propose to emphasize an entirely different aspect of the Cartesian theory of ideas which, in my view, is more fundamental in opening the empiricist path that leads to Hume’s radical skepticism. I argue that what I (...) call the “phenomenological presentation” model of ultimate justification is rooted in a fundamental ambiguity between sensible and intellectual apprehension insinuated by Descartes’s view of “clear and distinct” ideas together with his emphasis on the priority of intuition over logical inference. Sensible apprehension relies on immediate acquaintance with items phenomenologically and ostensively present before the mind as given particulars. The phenomenological presentation model takes its clues from sensible apprehension, although the items present before the mind might themselves be either ideas of the understanding, images of the imagination, sensory impressions, or material external objects. Intellectual apprehension, by contrast, as I illustrate with Leibniz’s model of our knowledge of concepts and truths of reason, consists in the discursive, non-ostensive grasping of the generality of abstract concepts and of formal structures . For Leibniz, all intellectual apprehension is unambiguously “logical discursive apprehension” as opposed to “direct ostensive apprehension.” Thus, Leibniz unmistakably disambiguates Descartes’s model in favor of a precise intellectual model. The empiricists, by contrast, correspondingly disambiguate Descartes’s conception in favor of an entirely sensible model. (shrink)